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Abstract—Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is a vision which offers safe, secure and smart travel experience to drivers.
This futuristic plan aims to enable vehicles, roadside transportation infrastructures, pedestrian smart-phones and other devices to
communicate with one another to provide safety and convenience services. Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I)
communication in ITS offers ability to exchange speed, heading angle, position and other environment related conditions amongst
vehicles and with surrounding smart infrastructures. In this intelligent setup, vehicles and users communicate and exchange data
with random untrusted entities (like vehicles, smart traffic lights or pedestrians) whom they don’t know or have met before. The
concerns of location privacy and secure communication further deter the adoption of this smarter and safe transportation. In this
paper, we present a secure and trusted V2V and V2I communication approach using edge infrastructures where instead of direct peer
to peer communication, we introduce trusted cloudlets to authorize, check and verify the authenticity, integrity and ensure anonymity of
messages exchanged in the system. Moving vehicles or road side infrastructure are dynamically connected to nearby cloudlets, where
security policies can be implemented to sanitize or stop fake messages and prevent rogue vehicles to exchange messages with other
vehicles. We also present a formal attribute-based model for V2V and V2I communication, called AB-ITS, along with proof of concept
implementation of the proposed solution in AWS IoT platform. This cloudlet supported architecture complements direct V2V or V2I
communication, and serves important use cases such as accident or ice-threat warning and other safety applications. Performance
metrics of our proposed architecture are also discussed and compared with existing ITS technologies.
Index Terms—Smart Cars, Security, Privacy, V2V, V2I, Intelligent Transportation, ABAC, Edge Computing, Cloud, Cloudlets, Connected
Vehicles, Trusted Communication, Amazon Web Services (AWS)
F
1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
F UTURE smart world will be equipped with technologies andautonomous devices which collaborate among themselves
with minimal human interference. Automotive industry is one of
the front runners that has quickly embraced this technological
change. Connected vehicles (CVs) and smart cars have been
introduced, with a plethora of on-board sensors and applications
with internet connectivity to offer safety and comfort services to
users. Intelligent transportation for smart cities envision moving
entities interacting and exchanging information with other vehi-
cles, infrastructures or on-road pedestrians. Federal and private
agencies are defining communication standards and technologies
for Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) to ensure safety, and
address security and privacy concerns of end users.
Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I)
are two proposed technological innovations which can change
current transportation. V2V will enable vehicles to exchange
information about speed, location, position, direction, or brake
status with other surrounding vehicles where receiving vehicles
will aggregate these messages and make smart decisions using
on-board applications which will warn drivers about accidents,
over-speed, slow traffic ahead, aggressive driver, blind spot or a
road hazard. V2I will enable road side units (RSUs) or traffic
infrastructures to transmit information about bridge permissible
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height, merging traffic, work zone warning or road hazard de-
tection to complement V2V applications. Vehicle to pedestrian
(V2P) is also envisioned to cater to pedestrians, such as with
visual or physical impairments, and send corresponding alerts
to approaching vehicles. These communication technologies will
use Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) [1] to ex-
change data packets, called Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) [2],
with nearby vehicles and entities between 300-500 meters range.
Messages will be sent up to 10 times per second providing a 360-
degree view of proximity, with on-board applications using the
information for triggering alerts and warnings. US Department
of Transportation (DOT) and National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) estimate around 80% of non-impaired
collisions [3], [4] and 6.9 billions traffic hours can be reduced by
using V2V, V2I and V2P communications.
Vehicles in ITS are communicating and exchanging infor-
mation with external entities including toll booths, gas stations,
parking lots, and other vehicles, which raises security and privacy
issues. Incidents on Jeep and Tesla [5], [6] have been demonstrated
where car engine was shut and steering wheel controlled remotely
by adversaries. These smart cars are equipped with 100’s of
electronic control units (ECUs) and more than 100 million lines
of code, thereby, exposing broad attack surface for critical car
systems including transmission control, air-bag, telematics, engine
or infotainment systems. In-vehicle controller area network (CAN)
bus also needs security to prevent unauthorized data exchange and
tampering among ECUs and software manipulation. Cyber attacks
on smart connected vehicles [7]–[10] include: unauthorized over
the air updates (OTA) for firmware, stealing user private data,
spoofing sensors, coordinated attacks on road side infrastructure
or malware injection. Dynamic and mobile nature of V2X (Vehicle
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to everything) communication makes it additionally difficult to
secure the distributed system where vehicles will be exchanging
data with random unknown entities on road. Impersonation and
fake message from malicious compromised vehicles is also a grave
concern as the information exchanged is used by other vehicles
to make alerts and notifications. Vehicle users also have privacy
concerns where every movement can be tracked continuously by
agencies or data collected from vehicles can be used to extrapolate
personal identifiable information (PII). These concerns lead to
reluctance in embracing these future transportation technologies.
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) [11]–[13] provides fine
grained authorization capabilities for resources in a system. This
mechanism offers flexibility in a distributed multi-entity dynamic
environment where the attributes of entities along with contex-
tual information are used to make access and communication
authorization decisions. Intelligent transportation system involves
interaction and messages exchange among entities with no prior
association. Attributes of vehicles or transportation infrastructure
can be used to authorize communication decision based on their
current location, ownership or degree of trust. Such security mech-
anisms can help to prevent fake messages, stop rogue vehicles and
ensure privacy aware message communication besides ensuring
location and time sensitive relevance of exchanged information.
In this work, we present a privacy-aware secure attribute-
based V2V and V2I communication architecture and model using
trusted cloudlets. These cloudlets are setup in wide geographic
locations with defined coverage area. Each cloudlet will receive
messages from vehicles in its range and forward it to all other
vehicles associated with that cloudlet. Vehicles are dynamically
assigned to these cloudlets as they move along geographic bound-
aries based on their GPS coordinates and predicted path. An
important benefit of this indirect V2V and V2I communication
is the deployment of security policies at edge cloudlets which
can restrict or block fake messages, and ensure trustworthiness
in communication. Moreover edge cloudlets also enable message
anonymization and user privacy, as the receiver cannot detect who
is the sender as all messages come through edge infrastructures.
These cloudlets can also be used to forward certificate revocation
lists (CRLs) to vehicles in the range beside blocking the vehicles
themselves. Rogue vehicle list can be dynamically updated at
the edges, and messages from a vehicle in the rogue list can be
blocked. The proposed architecture and attribute-based policies
ensure the important security properties of message integrity,
originator authenticity and user privacy concerns in V2V and V2I
communication. This MQTT [14] based approach for messages
exchange can be used in addition to DSRC to enable use cases with
acceptable latency (discussed in implementation section) without
the need for additional hardware cost1 and work with familiar
technologies such as WiFi, LTE or 5G. This work proposes
a formalized communication security model for V2V and V2I
called attribute-based intelligent transportation system (AB-ITS).
We have implemented our proposed architecture and model using
AWS and collected several performance metrics, which reflect the
plausibility and efficiency of our proposal.
Rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses related
work along with USDOT proposed Security Credential Manage-
ment System (SCMS). Security and privacy requirements along
with the proposed cloudlet supported ITS architecture is given
1. NHTSA proposed V2V equipment and communication is between $341
to $350 per vehicle in 2020 [15]
in Section 3. Section 4 presents formal attribute-based V2V
and V2I communication model (AB-ITS). Section 5 describes
our implementation with real-world use cases using AWS, and
discusses performance parameters. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
Connected and smart vehicle applications need wireless exchange
of V2X messages among unknown moving vehicles, RSUs and
pedestrians. The proposed intelligent transportation system (ITS)
for future cities has underlying technologies, security concerns
and proposed solutions, which we briefly review in this section.
2.1 Security Credentials Management System
United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) has sug-
gested a PKI-based security infrastructure system, called Security
Credentials Management System or SCMS [16], [17], to ensure
trusted V2V and V2I communication among random moving
entities. Authorized participating vehicles use digital certificates
issued by SCMS to validate and authenticate basic safety messages
(BSMs), by attaching these certificates with each message to
ensure integrity, confidentiality and privacy of the communication.
Vehicles need initial enrollment into SCMS to obtain security
certificates from trusted certificate authorities (CA). Each BSM
will include vehicle related information digitally signed using
private key corresponding to the digital certificate attached with
BSM. Different certificate types are used including enrollment,
pseudonym and identification for vehicle and enrollment appli-
cations for RSUs. Certificates can be cancelled for potential
adversaries or reported misbehaving vehicles by CAs by dissem-
inating certificate revocation lists (CRLs). USDOT and NHTSA
claim [4] that BSMs will exchange anonymized information and
no personal identifiable data will be shared with other entities.
SCMS is considered as a central system to be trusted by entities
participating to revolutionize transportation.
However, there are some challenges [18], [19] that need to
be addressed before the system is deployed. Each vehicle will
receive 20 certificates weekly to sign the BSMs [20], which will
rotate every 5 minutes. Therefore, a vehicle will use a new set of
20 certificates every 100 minutes. In such a scenario a computer
can analyse all the certificates a vehicle used in a day and then
use these certificates to track it for a week. Although, PKI based
SCMS system ensures who signed the certificate, it is difficult to
prove how correct or true the information sent from the vehicle is.
A malfunctioning device in the vehicle can result in false BSMs
exchanged even though the sender is trusted. Further, the proposed
SCMS system will be largest and complex ever built producing
265B to 800B certs/year depending on weekly rate supporting
17M vehicles/year [19]. The revocation of certificates for bad
actors would result in pushing CRLs to all enrolled vehicles, which
will be time and bandwidth consuming.
2.2 Relevant Background and Technologies
Several general IoT architectures [21]–[23] have been proposed
with different middleware layers in multi-layer stack representing
physical objects, communication or service layer, cloud and end-
user applications. Gupta and Sandhu proposed [24] enhanced
access control oriented architecture (E-ACO) particularly relevant
to smart cars and intelligent transportation. The work introduced
clustered objects (smart objects with multiple sensors like cars)
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Figure 1: Four Layered E-ACO Architecture [24]
as component of object layer which interact with other objects
similar to V2V and V2I communication. As shown in Figure 1,
E-ACO architecture has four layers: Object Layer at the bottom
representing physical objects including connected cars, vehicles
and RSUs. Virtual Object Layer maintains cyber entity (like
an AWS shadow stored as JSON) of each physical object which
is imperative in a moving and dynamic ecosystem like smart
cars, where the connectivity of a vehicle is not continuously
guaranteed. With virtual objects, when direct communication with
physical object is not possible, its virtual entity maintains last
reported and desired state information. Further, it resolves the
issues of heterogeneity as objects support different communication
technologies. Using virtual objects, physical entities communicate
with corresponding virtual objects where messages are exchanged
with virtual entities of other object which is then passed to actual
physical object. Cloud Services and Application Layer together
harness data sent by physical objects and use it to extrapolate
value, analytics and provide end user cloud supported applications.
Smart cars security incidents including Jeep [5] and Tesla
Model X [6] hacks have demonstrated how engine was stopped
and steering remotely controlled exhibiting cyber threats. Security
and privacy issues in smart cars and ITS are serious concerns
where several federal agencies are working along with industry
partners to “fully” proof the system before final deployment and
use by common public. European Union Agency for Network
and Information Security (ENISA) [25] has studied vulnerable
assets in smart cars with related threat and risks, and proposed
some prevention approaches with recommendations. Cooperative
Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS) [26], [27] also highlighted
the need of data communication integrity and authenticity in V2V
and V2I, and proposed PKI based trust model using pseudonym
certificates. NHTSA report [28] has thoroughly explored the
technical, legal and policy related issues pertinent to V2V commu-
nication and studied technological solutions for safety and privacy
issues. US Government Accountability Office (GAO) [7] has also
Figure 2: V2V and V2I Peer to Peer Communication
discussed security risks and potential attack surfaces in smart
vehicles, and proposed solutions to prevent cyber threats.
Attribute based access control [11], [29], [30] provides fine
grained authorization capabilities most appropriate in dynamic and
distributed systems similar to ITS. Recently dynamic groups and
ABAC model [31], [32] was proposed for smart cars ecosystem
which caters to mobile needs of vehicles. However the model
is more suitable to cloud assisted applications and a real time
V2V and V2I edge supported model is still missing. Role based
access controls [33], [34] were designed particularly for enterprise
applications with a limited set of roles and administrators assign-
ing roles to users. Similar concept does not seem to fit dynamic
and random unknown IoT smart cars setting where devices and
vehicles are in different administrative domains spread across
geographic area.
3 PROPOSED CLOUDLETS SUPPORTED ITS AR-
CHITECTURE
The current peer to peer V2V and V2I communication as rep-
resented in Figure 2 is proposed to use SCMS to ensure secure
trusted basic safety messages exchange among entities. However,
the vast and complex scale of this PKI based system has user
privacy and security concerns which need to be addressed before
its deployment. In this section, we will discuss security and privacy
requirements of ITS and smart cars ecosystem and highlight how
the proposed trusted cloudlets supported communication offers the
required security and complements current solutions.
3.1 Security and Privacy Requirements
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) involves real time sharing
of location and sensitive information about vehicles and passen-
gers, which pose a serious privacy threat and a strong deterrent for
its adoption. Dynamic and distributed ITS will enable interaction
with random entities on road with no prior trust established,
and the information sent from these smart vehicles will be used
by on-board applications to provide safety and warning signals,
which itself has some inherent security risks. An adversary can
compromise a road-side unit or vehicle to send fake information
about traffic or accident, which can trigger unnecessary alerts and
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Figure 3: Proposed Trusted Cloudlets Supported V2V and V2I Communication Architecture
may distract drivers. Basic safety messages (BSMs) are designed
to contain no personal identifiable information (PII) and are
attached with a certificate issued by certificate authority in SCMS.
However, limited number of certificates and number of messages
sent per minute can reveal the identity of a targeted vehicle with
advanced computer techniques. Untrackability of vehicles and
users is paramount to ensure privacy in ITS. Also, the system
must not save personal or individual information and use it as
law enforcement or issuing speeding tickets. Anonymity of sender
must always be maintained. Over the air messages exchanged
among smart entities must have integrity, and authenticity. Se-
curity mechanisms to protect smart cars and their critical systems
from unauthorized access, control and tampering are important
to strengthen intelligent transportation. Integrated approach of
DSRC and cellular technologies is needed based on different
ITS applications. Cloud and cloudlets supported architectures will
provide resiliency and reduce system stress. Encrypted and secure
data transfer link is the backbone needed from DSRC, cellular LTE
or any communication technologies involved in ITS. However,
limited bandwidth and latency issues in cloud connectivity needed
for certificate updates and revocation needs attention.
In smart city, location based notifications for connected vehi-
cles must allow user to have personal preferences where a user
may want weather warning and not parking advertisements on
board. Dynamic policies are required, for example, in case of a
traffic jam in an area a policy may ask all drivers to follow route
A but considering the heavy traffic on route A, the policy may be
changed to move traffic to route B or C. This can be implemented
at the edge level and triggered by central administrators. In such
a case, whether the administrative subject is authorized to change
the policy or trigger an alert, also needs security checks.
3.2 How Cloudlets Can Provide Security?
Figure 3 shows the proposed edge supported architecture for
V2V and V2I communication. Trusted edge infrastructures (setup
by city administration) will work as a middle man and relay
messages to vehicles and other entities inside its geographic
range. Instead of peer to peer connection, all vehicles publish
to edges, where security policies defined are checked to ensure
validity and integrity of the communication, and relevance of
messages, before forwarding to other vehicles. A vehicle can be in
range of multiple infrastructures, depending on its location. Each
vehicle will be dynamically associated with edges as it moves. All
participating vehicles and RSUs still need to enroll with a central
authority to be part of the system, to ensure that only trusted
vehicles are allowed to exchange messages among themselves.
Communication technologies used for vehicles to cloudlets can
be cellular LTE, WiFi or DSRC. MQTT messaging protocol can
be used, as discussed in implementation which will obviate the
cost of DSRC equipments needed in smart cars. The proposed
architecture is implemented in addition to V2V and V2I direct
communication and is supported in NPRM [35] documents which
recommend both DSRC and secondary communication for ITS.
Trusted cloudlets installed in wide geographic area offer
the needed fog infrastructure functionality required in an IoT
environment. They can address security concerns by deploying
and enforcing security policies to ensure trusted communication
among smart entities on the road. This proposed architecture offers
an alternate edge supported V2V and V2I communication with
minimal message latency and in permissible time limits [36], [37].
A vehicle sending and receiving BSM or other messages, must be
associated with an edge infrastructure, which will enforce policies,
sanitize messages, prevent fake messages dissemination and offer
administrative advantages. Each cloudlet will have a geographic
range and all the vehicles within it will get associated with the
edge automatically. Since the range of edge is within a restricted
limited area, it also ensures location sensitivity of messages ex-
changed, as vehicles communicating messages must be associated
to a common edge cloudlet. Message anonymity and sanitization
can be done, since the messages sent by a vehicle are relayed
via the edge cloudlet without direct peer to peer communication,
which will have less security and privacy implications.
Further, using cloudlets offers administrative benefits as single
notification from edge infrastructure will trigger alerts for all the
vehicles which are connected to it in a geographic range. If an
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agency or a police vehicle wants to send alerts, instead of sending
to each individual vehicle, they can send it to a trusted cloudlet,
which after checking the policies to ensure the sender is allowed
to generate such requests, forwards or stops the message. Also,
entities present in a particular area have certain characteristics
(for example, stop sign warning, speed limits, deer-threat, flash
flood warnings etc.) in common, which can be inherited by getting
dynamically associated to edge infrastructures, without the need to
generate messages 10 times per second [28] to get this information
from other vehicles or RSUs saving network bandwidth.
It is also possible to limit the messages to a specific set
of vehicles, for example, in case of a kidnapped child warning,
messages can be sent to nearby edge infrastructures and then to
only police vehicles in the area, and not to the common public
using security policies defined at the cloudlet. Edge infrastruc-
ture can also have the capacity to filter unwanted and incorrect
messages from the vehicles and infrastructure using a majority
rule policy. For example, if an adversary is sending accident
message (either deliberately or a malfunction sensor on vehicle)
to subvert the traffic whereas other vehicles notify no accident
and clear traffic messages, installed trusted edge will have the
intelligence and policy to filter such fake messages and forward
the correct information to its associated vehicles. This will not be
possible in peer to peer V2X (vehicle to anything) architecture
immediately, until certificate revocations (by a central authority)
are propagated to individual vehicle, which may take time and also
require internet connectivity which cannot be guaranteed all times
in terrains where the vehicle is moving. Also, instead of sending
CRLs to each vehicle, only edge servers can be sent with list of
revoked certificates and based on the information, edge can decide
if the messages sent by vehicle should be forwarded or not.
Further, if an adversary is detected by an edge with fake or
wrong messages, policies can be defined to inform appropriate
agencies and law enforcement in the area where such malicious
behaviour is detected. It is also possible to have different levels
of alerts based on the degree of trust and who is the sender. Law
enforcement initiating a bomb threat in the vicinity will be treated
as major threat and edge infrastructure states it as code red alert,
with immediate rerouting and emergency exit directions.
4 CLOUDLETS ENABLED ATTRIBUTE BASED V2V
AND V2I COMMUNICATION
Edge cloudlets supported V2V and V2I communication has many
advantages, as discussed in previous section. These cloudlets can
support attributes based fine-grained policies based on which
communication decisions can be made. These attributes offer
flexibility and take into account different environmental factors
along with dynamic policies based on administrator needs. Further,
individual users are also allowed to set their own privacy prefer-
ences, to decide on what and from whom messages are allowed to
receive. In this section, we formally define our proposed cloudlets
supported attributes based intelligent transportation system model,
which we refer to as AB-ITS.
4.1 AB-ITS Communication Model
The conceptual AB-ITS communication model is shown in Figure
4 and formal definitions elaborated in Table 1. The model has
following components: Vehicles (V), Transportation Infrastructure
Devices (I), Users (U), Sources (S), Trusted Cloudlets (TC), Target
Figure 4: A Conceptual AB-ITS Communication Model
Vehicles (VT), Operations (OP), Authorization Policies (POL),
and Attributes (ATT).
Sources (S) : A source initiates operations on cloudlets (discussed
below) in the system. A source can be from a set of vehicles (V),
transportation infrastructure (I) or an administrator user (U). For
instance, in case of V2V communication, a source is a vehicle
which wants to send messages to other vehicles in its vicinity.
Similarly, law enforcement and city administration can initiate
theft and accident alerts in a particular area via cloudlets, which
are forwarded to all vehicles associated with cloudlet.
Trusted Cloudlets (TC) : Cloudlets are introduced, which are
trusted edge infrastructures set up across locations and facilitate
secure V2V and V2I communication. These cloudlets have a
limited geographic range and all vehicles in that range get associ-
ated with one or more TCs automatically based on their moving
location coordinates. Any communication between vehicles and
other entities including transportation infrastructures (or RSUs) is
done via TC, which checks security policies to forward or block
the messages sent by different sources. Also TCs have attributes
which are propagated to associated vehicles and can also help
setting alerts and warnings based on attribute values. For instance,
when a vehicle enters forest and gets associated with the cloudlet,
it can automatically inherit a wildlife area attribute ON from TC.
Target Vehicles (VT) : These vehicles are subset of total vehicles
(V) in the transportation system and are potential receiver of
messages sent by a source. Both target vehicles and source must be
associated with same TC to enable V2V and V2I communication.
Operations (OP) : Operations are actions which are performed
by source on TC. TC also execute operations against associated
vehicles and infrastructures. For example, a source initiating a
join operation to get associated with a TC, or trying to send a
message to vehicles via TC. Also, TC forwarding a message sent
by sources to its member vehicles is another example of operations
in ITS. These also include administrative actions performed by a
user including updating, deleting or adding attribute values for an
attribute or rogue vehicles list in TC.
Authorization Policies (POL) and Attributes (ATT) : Sources,
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TCs, vehicles and other relevant ITS entities can have personal
defined individual policies along with system wide authorization
policies needed for the overall secure functioning of the ecosys-
tem. Vehicles owners can set individual privacy preferences which
enable them to allow or disallow any particular private information
from being shared with a third party remotely. Similarly, city
traffic department may set its own rules when to trigger an alert
or warnings to vehicles in a sensitive or accident prone area.
Administrative policies are also needed to authorize a legitimate
user to change attributes, send notifications to TCs or update
rogue vehicles list. Entities like vehicles and sources also have
individual characteristics, called attributes, which are used to make
authorization and communication decisions in ITS. For a vehicle,
sample attributes can be: vehicle ID, speed, heading angle, brake,
vehicle size, vehicle type or preferred notifications. Vehicles and
infrastructure can also inherit attributes from their associated TCs,
which can have common location wide attributes like speed limit,
road work ahead or blind turn.
Both attributes and policies are dynamic which can be changed
by administrators or vehicle owners based on system needs and
personal preferences. The attributes of vehicles like location, speed
or heading angle are continuously changing, but other attributes
like vehicle size remain static. Policies are also dynamic in nature,
as reflected in use-case implementation in the next section, where
we defined a security policy with a list of black-listed rogue
vehicles which are notified to law enforcement when detected by
TCs. This list is dynamic in nature and is continuously updated
by administrators, demonstrating how dynamic policies are used
and enforced in ITS. It must be noted that in a session the
proposed model assumes a static set of policies and attributes
which are used to make V2V and V2I communication decision.
All relevant polices including system defined and user preferences
are evaluated to make the final communication decision.
In our proposed model, TCs evaluate security policies and
ensure that un-trusted or fake messages are not forwarded to
associated vehicles in its geographic coverage boundary. These
connected vehicles must initiate association with TCs pro-actively
based on their predicted path, and once they get into the range of
the TCs, vehicles become the member of TC. Such communication
with TCs can be done using encrypted and secure cellular or WiFi
technologies with no added equipment cost. It should be noted that
our model complements the proposed DSRC based direct V2V
and V2I communication, and can be used to assist in situations
where the authenticity and integrity of messages is much needed.
Our use-cases in the next section will highlight the real world
enforcement and use of AB-ITS model.
4.2 Formal Definitions
Table 1 elaborates the formal AB-ITS communication model defi-
nitions, which comprise of vehicles (V), transportation infrastruc-
ture devices (I), administrative users (U) and edge cloudlets (TC).
A source in S initiating an operation op ∈ OP can be from a set
of vehicles, transportation infrastructures or users, whereas target
vehicles VT is a subset of total vehicles in the entire transportation
system (VT ⊆ V). Attributes are functions defined for source and
edge cloudlets, where functions can be set or atomic valued (stated
by attType) and are assigned values from Range(att) for each att
∈ ATT. The atomic valued attributes are assigned single value
including null (denoted as ⊥) whereas set valued attribute can
have a subset of values assigned from power set of the range of
attribute function. Some attributes are also defined system wide,
which reflect the state of entire transportation system (like level of
threat or city traffic) and are set by administrators. Authorization
security policies are defined for individual sources and TCs, which
are either stated based on personal privacy preferences or are
enforced system wide as defined by central administrators. For
example, a driver may not want to receive marketing commercials
on dashboard, so she can set such personal preference as choosing
the desired policy, whereas police can define a policy with a list
of black-listed cars and blocking communication from them.
Source and target vehicles are dynamically assigned to one or
many trusted edge cloudlets based on their current GPS coordi-
nates and predicted path as defined by associated cloudlets func-
tion. The association with edge cloudlets is fixed for transportation
infrastructures or administrators which are assigned at the time of
system deployment whereas for vehicles it keeps on changing as
the vehicles move. Each cloudlet has defined geographic coverage
area and when vehicles enter the area, they get associated with
the cloudlet. A vehicle may be associated with multiple cloudlets
in areas where coverage areas are overlapping, thereby, a vehicle
is always associated to at least one cloudlet at all times. These
cloudlets mediate the V2V and V2I communication by enforcing
security policies, stop fake messages and ensure privacy, as dis-
cussed later in the model definitions. Further, sources (including
vehicles) inherit attributes from their associated cloudlets, which
helps in administration and propagation of common attributes
to all associated entities with single administrative action. For
instance, at a location where flash flood warning is issued, the
edge cloudlet installed there will set attribute flash-flood = ON for
all its associated vehicles when they become members of that
cloudlet. In case of set valued attribute function, the effective
attribute values for att ∈ ATT of source (defined as effSatt),
including target vehicles, is the union of direct values assigned to
the source for attribute att and the values assigned to att for each
associated cloudlets. However, in case of atomic valued attribute, it
is necessary to define which attribute values take precedence when
multiple edge clouds are associated. In our model, we propose
that most recently connected cloudlet with non null value for the
attribute will be inherited by the associated source or vehicles.2
For example, the speed-limit attribute of most recently associated
cloudlet will be populated for all member vehicles, and as the
vehicle moves, this value is inherited from next associated edge
cloudlet and so on. This inheritance in atomic values attribute only
takes place when edge cloudlets have non null values, whereby
with all associated cloudlets having null values, the direct attribute
value of the source holds as its effective value also.
Authorization functions are parameterized propositional logic
formulae defined to represent access control security policies
stated in the policy language defined in Table 1. The function
Authop(s:S, tc:TC) specify conditions under which source s
(including vehicles) can perform an operation op ∈ via cloudlet
tc ∈ TC. These boolean authorization functions are evaluated
substituting actual arguments for formal parameters along with
direct and effective attributes values of actual arguments. Similar
syntax and policy language can be defined for other set of policies
including personal vehicle specific policies or system wide poli-
cies with attributes of relevant entities substituted in authorization
2. There are other approaches also to deal with atomic value inheritance,
but for moving vehicles which are dynamically assigned to new cloudlets, we
believe this approach is the most appropriate and relevant.
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Table 1: Formal AB-ITS Communication Model Definitions
Basic Sets and Functions
– V, I, U, TC are finite sets of vehicles, transportation infrastructure devices, (administrative) users, and trusted cloudlets respectively.
– S, VT, OP are finite sets of sources, target vehicles, and operations respectively, where S = I ∪ V ∪ U and VT ⊆ V.
– ATT is a finite set of attributes associated with S, TC, and system-wide.
– For each attribute att in ATT, Range(att) is a finite set of atomic values.
– attType: ATT = {set, atomic}, defines attributes to be set or atomic valued.
– Each attribute att in ATT maps entities in S and TC, and system-wide to attribute values. Formally,
att : S ∪ TC ∪ {system-wide} →
{
Range(att) ∪ {⊥} if attType(att) = atomic
2Range(att) if attType(att) = set
– POL is a finite set of authorization policies associated with individual entities in S and TC, and system-wide.
– associated cloudlets : S→ 2TC, maps each source (including target vehicles) to a set of trusted cloudlets.
Equivalently, relations SEA = {(s, tc) | tc ∈ associated cloudlets(s)} and EVT = SEA ∩ VT × TC.
Effective Attributes of Sources Including Vehicles
– For each attribute att in ATT such that attType(att) = set :
• effSatt : S→ 2Range(att), defined as effSatt(s) = att(s)
⋃
tc∈associated cloudlets(s) att(tc).
– For each attribute att in ATT such that attType(att) = atomic :
• effSatt : S→ Range(att) ∪ {⊥}, defined as
effSatt(s) =
{
att(s) if ∀ tc ∈ associated cloudlets(s). att(tc) = ⊥, otherwise
att(tc) where tc was most recently assigned att(tc) 6= ⊥ amongst all tc′ ∈ associated cloudlets(s)
Authorization Functions (Policies)
– Authorization Function: For each op ∈ OP, Authop(s : S, tc : TC) is a parameterized propositional logic formulae returning true
or false, defined using the following policy language:
• α ::= α ∧ α | α ∨ α | (α) | ¬α | ∃ x ∈ set.α | ∀ x ∈ set.α | set4 set | atomic ∈ set | atomic /∈ set
• 4 ::= ⊂ | ⊆ | * | ∩ | ∪
• set ::= effatt(i) | att(i) for att ∈ ATT, i ∈ S ∪ TC ∪ {system-wide}, attType(att) = set
• atomic ::= effatt(i) | att(i) | value for att ∈ ATT, i ∈ S ∪ TC ∪ {system-wide}, attType(att) = atomic
– Authorization Function Evaluation: Authorization functions are evaluated by substituting actual arguments for formal parameters
along with attribute values of actual arguments, thus reducing the parameterized formula to a propositional logic formula
for evaluation.
Authorization Decision
– A source s′∈ S is allowed to perform an operation op ∈ OP on edge cloudlet tc′∈ TC (where s′and tc′are actual arguments),
if all the required policies stated in Authop(s′: S, tc′: TC), are satisfied. Formally, Authop(s′: S, tc′: TC) = True.
Authorization Communication Property
– To communicate a message between s′∈ S and v′∈ VT requires authorization for individual operations {send, forward} ∈ OP
where send[s′, tc′] and forward[tc′, v′] are operation signatures meaning send operation is performed by s′to tc′and forward
is executed by tc′to v′. The authorization functions evaluated to allow communication between s′and v′include
Authsend(s′: S, tc′: TC) and Authforward(tc′: TC, v′: VT).
– A source s′∈ S is allowed to communicate a message to vehicle v′∈ VT if both the source and vehicle are associated with the
same trusted cloudlet tc′∈ TC, and all the required policies are evaluated to make communication authorization decision.
Formally, ∃ tc′∈ TC. (Authsend(s′: S, tc′: TC) ∧ Authforward(tc′: TC, v′: VT)) ∧ (System-Wide Policies) = True
requests evaluation. Authorization decision to allow s′ ∈ S to
perform an operation op ∈ OP on tc′ ∈ TC is determined when
the authorization function is evaluated with the actual arguments
(s′ ∈ S, tc′ ∈ TC) to be True. Similarly, the decision for operation
op from tc′ ∈ TC to v′∈ VT is made by calling the relevant
authorization function with actual parameters.
As discussed in authorization property, the model has de-
fined two primitive operations, ‘send’ and ‘forward’ relevant for
V2V and V2I communication. A source uses ‘send’ operation
(defined as Authsend(s′: S, tc′: TC)) to communicate a ‘send
message’ to trusted cloudlet, whereas ‘forward’ operation (defined
as Authforward(tc′: TC, v′: VT)) is between trusted cloudlet
and target vehicle defining a ‘forward message’. For allowing,
communication from s′to v′requires a common tc′ to which both
s′and v′are associated and the required authorization functions
for send and forward messages i.e Authsend(s′: S, tc′: TC) and
Authforward(tc′: TC, v′: VT) as well as the system defined
security policies evaluate to True. Additional relevant operations
and messages can be similarly defined.
The proposed AB-ITS model leverages attributes and GPS
coordinates of communicating entities to enable and secure V2V
and V2I communication. The introduction of trusted cloudlets
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provide benefits of enforcing security policies at the edge to stop
fake messages, enhance user privacy and integrity of messages
before forwarded to other target vehicles. These edge cloudlets
ensure low latency and near real time communication much
needed in most ITS applications without bandwidth issues. It must
be noted that the messages shared among source and vehicles are
end to end encrypted and can still use the proposed DSRC wireless
technology for communication with cloudlet and then to the
vehicles. Our model complements the USDOT proposed V2V and
V2I architecture functionalities and support applications which
need additional message integrity and confidentiality, and can be
used as an add on to current ITS peer to peer communication.
5 IMPLEMENTATION IN AWS
In this section we present a proof of concept implementation of
AB-ITS model in Amazon Web Services (AWS) [38]. We use
AWS IoT service along with AWS Greengrass [39] (to provide
edge functionality) to setup a realistic environment where vehicles
are simulated as AWS IoT things. In particular, these stand alone
services are implemented as a Lambda function [40] using Boto
[41] which is AWS SDK for Python. It should be noted that in this
implementation no long term GPS data coordinates of vehicles are
collected in cloudlets. This reduces privacy concerns of end users
and encourages adoption of the proposed model.
5.1 Use Cases Overview
US-DOT has proposed an extensive list of ITS applications [42]
which we have used to create our real life connect use-cases.
Our implementation addresses trust, security and privacy issues
concerning end users which must be satisfied before bringing ITS
technology in practice. As most applications are safety related, we
have considered accident and ice-on-road (tire slip) alerts as our
running use-case along with real-time detection and prevention of
rogue (or malicious) vehicles on road. In the use-cases, we have
also shown how different entities (S, TC, VT etc.) fit in the formal
model definitions.
Accidental Safety and Ice-Threat : Moving vehicles (S) can
generate warnings for other vehicles (VT) in their surrounding
based on an event which they sensed or encountered. In our use-
case, we consider ‘ice-threat’ alerts based on a tire slip wherein
vehicles are notified a warning, if any nearby vehicle ‘feels’ it and
broadcasts, after satisfying security policies implemented at the
edge infrastructures (TC). These policies take into account: who is
the source of alert, location of vehicle (ATT) and how many other
vehicles encountered similar event, before forwarding (OP) these
alerts to other nearby approaching vehicles (VT). It is possible that
a single vehicle (S) sends an ice-threat alert to associated cloudlet
(TC), while other vehicles in the area sense no such movement.
Therefore the edge will be able to filter such malfunctioning or
deliberate malicious attempt from the vehicle and also notify law
enforcement and put that vehicle in rogue vehicles list. Further,
in case of an accident, alert messages will be generated and sent
only to police or medical vehicles in the area. Based on the type
of alerts and who generates it, policies are defined in the system
to ensure trusted, anonymized and relevant notifications.
Compromised Rogue Vehicles : Rogue vehicle either in-
tentionally or due to sensor failure can send fake messages
to other vehicles. Misbehaving and compromised vehicles must
be detected in smart transportation and alerts must be issued
Figure 5: System Architecture
Table 2: AWS Setup Parameter Information
Message Queue Size 2.5 MB
Number of AWS Greengrass Groups 4
Range of Vehicles per groups 1 – 50
Published Range of Messages
(per second per vehicle)
1 – 20
Greengrass Server Configuration 8 VCPUs, 4 GB RAM
Simulated Vehicles Server Config. 2 VCPUs, 4 GB RAM
Average Network traffic (50 vehicles) 255 Kbps
Network Capacity of Interface 1.84 Mbps
immediately to discard the information sent by them. In our use-
case, central cloud authority (S) informs edge infrastructures (TC)
with a list of detected rogue vehicles and when any message
is received by an edge from these vehicles, it is not forwarded
to other vehicles. Further, law enforcement is informed about
the location (ATT) of a rogue vehicle to prevent fake message
dissemination. This approach prevents the need to update and
publish revocation list to all vehicles eliminating the bandwidth
and connectivity issues.
5.2 Proof of Concept
We will first go over the system configuration along with imple-
mented security policies defined in the cloudlet before we delve
into more details of our developed prototype.
System Architecture : Figure 5 represents system architecture
along with different components implemented for our prototype.
All the vehicles and static smart entities including edge infrastruc-
tures must be registered with a central cloud controller to ensure
trusted authorized participating entities. Further, the controller
also helps in the administrative phase (discussed later) which
includes providing a list of edge infrastructures on designated
path of moving vehicle. Once the registration is done and vehicles
are sent a list of edge infrastructures, the vehicles publish and
subscribe to secure (and reserved) MQTT topics created in each
of cloudlets which get dynamically assigned based on vehicle
current GPS coordinates. It is also possible that the moving vehicle
keeps on sending coordinates to the cloud and the controller lets
them know the IP address of the nearby edge infrastructures to
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Figure 6: Implemented Security Policies
which the vehicle has to associate. These cloudlets (represented
as AWS Greengrass) hold the implemented security policies, a
lambda function (similar to policy decision point - PDP [12]) for
policy evaluation and the policy enforcement point (PEP) to check
messages received, anonymize and filter them and based on the
type of alert send them to relevant entities. It should be noted that
only alert messages go through the enforcement point, whereas no
alerts messages are discarded after logging. Table 2 lists different
AWS system parameters to provide a better understanding of
performance metrics shown later in this section.
Security Policies : We defined attributes based policies which
are enforced at the edge, to check who is allowed to send mes-
sages, conditions when the message is forwarded to other vehicles
and who are authorized recipients for different types of alerts in
the system. Various attributes can be included in policy but for
the sake of simplicity we used only vehicle type to determine the
source and destination of messages. As shown in Figure 6, security
policies are listed in JSON format, where three types of alerts
are being generated, ‘TireSlip’, ‘Accident’ and ‘Rogue’ vehicle
updates, as denoted by red rectangular boxes. We defined separate
set of conditions for each alert type. For example, in ‘TireSlip’
alerts, it is first checked if it is generated (‘Source’ attribute) by
a regular vehicle (specified by attribute value ‘Vehicle’) or by law
enforcement (‘Police’ or ‘Medical’). Policy then checks number
of vehicles which created similar alerts (specified by ”Number”
attribute). Notification to other vehicles depends on how many
alerts were generated or who is the source of alert. If the number
of alerts are greater than or equal to 2 from regular vehicles, or
even a single alert from police or medical vehicle, ”Ice-threat
High” notifications are sent to other associated vehicles of the
cloudlet. However, if an alert is generated by one regular vehicle,
Figure 7: Moving Vehicle Cloudlets Association
”Ice Threat - Low” is sent for all member vehicles. It must be
noted that the sender vehicles and the receiving vehicle must
be associated with the same cloudlet to exchange notifications,
which also ensure relevance of alerts being received. Similarly,
for accident use case, notification is only sent to nearby police
vehicles and medical with assistance message. Here the source is
not defined, since any smart entity including vehicle, or nearby
smart road side sensor or a pedestrian can send message to police
or medical vehicles. It is also possible that information about the
vehicle including color, license plate number or other identifying
information can be sent to law enforcement. Another important
use case is to enable a central law enforcement that can regularly
publish and update the list of rogue vehicles. This list for example,
could help locate vehicles that have been stolen or implicated in
amber alertsIn the last part of our policy for ‘Rogue’, vehicle
IDs Car-X, Car-Y, Vehicle-Z are stated as rogue and any
message from these vehicles is not forwarded. This is a dynamic
policy as the list is periodically updated by a central authority.
Also to extend the use-case, it is possible when an edge receives a
message from a rogue vehicle, it can forward that information to
nearby police along with vehicle information like license number
and color. The defined policies are only for alert messages, and
other ‘no alerts’ messages are just checked by the policy and are
logged and dropped without forwarding to any vehicle. Note that
policies can also be implemented inside the smart vehicle as well
to provide user privacy preference aware notifications, but are not
implemented in our prototype.
Implementation Details : The implementation of our pro-
posed solution involves two steps: the administrative phase and
the operational phase. Administrative phase includes setup of
cloudlets by city administration, setting up the boundaries for
each cloudlet, dynamic assignment of moving vehicles to edge
infrastructures, and attributes and alerts inheritance from edges
to the member vehicles. To be part of ITS, vehicles and smart
infrastructures need to have one time registration with central
cloud which ensures that smart entities are trusted and benign.
Once registered, the moving vehicles can be provided with a
mapped list of edges which will arrive in their designated route to
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Figure 8: Sequence Diagram for Cloudlets Supported V2V and V2I Communication
which they are allowed to connect. As the vehicles get dynamically
associated to different cloudlets, they are able to publish and
subscribe to the reserved topics on each edge infrastructures. The
operational phase consists of how these attributes and assignment
to cloudlets ensure the relevance of alerts to the vehicles and how
the edge deployed security policies are used to mitigate security
and privacy concerns of users who are using AB-ITS system.
In our prototype, we demarcated a big geographic location
area into several smaller regions and each region has a trusted
cloudlet (TC) which serves all the smart entities in the region
as shown in Figure 7. We used a python script to simulate
the movement of vehicles in the system, shown as green dots,
which sends MQTT messages containing GPS coordinates to a
central cloud. Service in cloud determines which edge cloudlets
are in the surrounding area of the vehicle and then assigns the
vehicle to the nearby cloudlets. Following is the sample MQTT
payload sent by a moving vehicle to its shadow reserved topic
$aws/things/‘Vehicle-Name’/shadow/update in the
cloud for dynamic cloudlet assignment:
{"state": {"reported":
{"Latitude": "28.1452683",
"Longitude":"-97.567259"}}}
As the path of vehicle is mostly known, these edge assignments
can be pro-active in nature as well, mitigating the concern of cloud
latency. In such a case, the cloud controller can send a list of
edge infrastructures which will be on the designated path of the
vehicle to get them associated when vehicles come in their range.
It is also possible that these cloudlets have a wireless range and
the vehicles which are in the range get automatically assigned
to these cloudlets. A vehicle can associate to multiple cloudlets
at a time based on their overlapping location. In Figure 7, static
smart objects like stop warning signs, road work ahead or other
infrastructures have fixed allocation to cloudlets, and the dotted
lines represent predicted future cloudlets of vehicle along with
current cloudlets by solid pink lines.
Once vehicles get assigned to nearby cloudlets, operational
phase starts where the vehicles send messages to its shadow
reserved topic (which gets created when the vehicle becomes
member of a cloudlet) in their associated edges, which enforce
security policies to ensure trusted and authorized alerts to nearby
vehicles in near real time manner. In all the policies defined,
privacy of the sender is well preserved as the messages do not
contain any personal identifiable information and are anonymous.
Following is a sample MQTT message sent by vehicle:
{"state":{"reported":
{"Longitude": "29.472741982",
"Latitude": "-98.50038363",
"Time": "2019-03-19 11:27:40.237734",
"Velocity": "30", "Direction": "north",
"Elevation": "650", "Posit. Accuracy":
"5", "Steering Wheel Angle": "0",
"Alert": myAlert}}}
In this message, beside BSM [2] attributes, an attribute ”Alert”
also exists, which defines what kind of alert has been sent from the
vehicle to cloudlets. For our use-cases, it can be an ”Accident”,
”Tireslip”, or ”Null” value where Null signifies no alert. Once
the message is received by cloudlet, and is checked against the
policies, the edge infrastructure forwards the following Tireslip
alert message to a generic topic test/devices to which the
vehicles subscribe when they become member of the edge.
{"message": "Ice Threat - Low’,
’myEvent’: ’2019-03-19 10:56:15.921834’"}
In case of accident alert following message:
{"message":"Accident- Require Assistance’,
’myEvent’: ’2019-03-19 11:27:40.237734’"}
is sent to topic test/medical and test/police to which
nearby medical and police vehicles are subscribed respectively.
Note that event time has also been added to messages, to ensure
when the message is not obsolete. Similarly, for updating the rogue
vehicle list from the transportation authority via central cloud to
the edge infrastructures, message
{"Alert": myAlert, "myVehicle": myVehicle}
is sent to test/Rogue-Vehicle topic. In this message,
’myAlert’ variable can be ADD, DELETE or LIST operation,
and ’myVehicle’ can hold the vehicles to be added or deleted. In
case of list operation, ’myVehicle’ attribute value is NULL. The
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(a) Accident Use Case
(b) Tire-Slip Use Case
Figure 9: Policy Evaluation Time
complete sequence of events for the administrative and operational
phase in cloudlet supported ITS is shown in Figure 8.
5.3 Performance Metrics and Discussion
We evaluated the performance of our proposed AB-ITS model in
AWS and provide metrics for the use-cases in proof of concept. We
first calculate the execution time for the proposed policy enforcer
to evaluate the attribute based security polices (shown in Figure
6) against the number of vehicles associated with a cloudlet and
scaling the number of messages sent per vehicle per second. In
Figure 9 (a) and (b), as the number of vehicles increase (along x
axis) with more messages being sent, the enforcer takes more time
to evaluate the polices and impact performance. This enforced
policy engine in cloudlet has the worse case execution time less
than 200 microseconds, for any number of messages sent per
second (from 1 to 20) by vehicles which could range from 1 to 50.
In case of no-alerts, this execution time will be zero as the policies
will not be evaluated. Total trip time performance of our model
includes time at which vehicle generates an alert till it is received
by target vehicles which includes the policy evaluation time. As
shown in Table 3 and 4, the total trip time is within the permissible
limits (∼100 ms [36]) for most of the case scenarios. However, the
trip time goes beyond the limits when 50 vehicles get associated
to single edge cloudlet at one time. The variation in total trip time
is due to network traffic and latency, but the average and standard
deviation infer that the performance is very comparable to peer to
peer ITS. It should be noted that the extra overhead induced by
Table 3: Total Trip Time for Accident
Msg. per Sec, Vehicles 1 5 10 50
1 71.72 23.53 32.45 39.85
5 18.94 79.69 78.87 69.11
10 30.73 73.73 28.57 83.89
15 18.01 22.31 30.06 ∼
20 18.04 34.40 65.82 ∼
Average 31.49 46.73 47.15 64.28
Standard Deviation 23.13 27.85 23.49 22.42
Table 4: Total Trip Time for TireSlip
Msg. per Sec, Vehicles 1 5 10 50
1 47.44 56.24 89.78 55.72
5 104.23 99.27 56.76 85.26
10 43.38 44.07 51.49 ∼
15 66.43 44.04 51.32 ∼
20 42.76 45.74 85.40 ∼
Average 60.85 57.87 66.95 70.49
Standard Deviation 26.10 23.69 19.03 20.89
policy execution (in microseconds) is very negligible as compared
to the total trip time (in milliseconds). In our approach MQTT
protocol has been used, therefore, if some one does not want use
DSRC due to cost of transmitter and receiver, our approach can
still work with the traditional IoT MQTT based communication
based on LTE, 5G or WiFi connectivity.
We understand that there may be hundreds of vehicles during
heavy traffic time, therefore, to scale the system and accommodate
all vehicles we can install more cloudlets and infrastructure
devices in busy areas that will reduce the number of vehicles
which will get associated with single cloudlet at a time. This
implementation in AWS showcases the practical viability and
use of fine grained polices in context of intelligent transportation
system, without the need to capture data points from real world
traffic. It must be also noted that, AWS Greengrass has limit of 200
devices per Greengrasss group, which means maximum number of
vehicles which can be associated can not be more than 200. We
can add more cloudlets in the system which can cater to higher
population of vehicles and smart entities. As mentioned earlier,
this proposed cloudlet supported V2V and V2I complements the
current DSRC approach and is not considered a replacement.
6 SUMMARY
This research work proposes a cloudlet assisted secure V2V and
V2I communication in intelligent transportation system, which
ensures trusted and reliable messages exchange among moving
entities on road. We introduce the novel notion of dynamic edge
associations in which the smart entities get connected to different
pre-installed cloudlets on road, which help them relay the basic
safety messages and perform the needed filtering and reduces
privacy concerns of the users. These cloudlets can anonymize
the messages, ensure trustworthiness and ensure their relevance
to entities which receive them. We also present the formal model
which specifies attributes based polices for V2V and V2I commu-
nication. Several use-cases of ITS have been discussed along with
implementation in Amazon Web Services (AWS). Performance
has been evaluated against time taken to evaluate the polices in
cloudlets and the total trip time from the moment message is
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generated till it gets received and relayed by the cloudlets. In
future work we would incorporate additional privacy preserving
approaches wherein the exact location GPS coordinates are not
required to be shared with cloud. The work can be complemented
using homomorphic encryption or other similar approaches which
will further mitigate privacy concerns of the users.
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